University of Southampton

Faculty Member, Philosophy

Senior Lecturer

About

Daniel Whiting’s principal areas of research interest are philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology, especially issues at their intersection. Immediately after completing his PhD, Daniel’s main focus was on the prospects of a use-based or inferentialist account of meaning. This quickly led him to examine a cluster of issues concerning semantic normativity, which led him in turn to examine various issues surrounding epistemic normativity. It was a short step from there to an interest in epistemic value. At present, Daniel divides his attention between all these topics and the points at which they overlap. He also maintains an interest in the history of philosophy, especially Wittgenstein.

Some recent and forthcoming publications:
'Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief', in The Aim of Belief, ed. T. Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).
'Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming, 2012).
'Epistemic Value and Achievement', Ratio (2012) 25: 216-230.
'Spinoza, the No Shared Attribute thesis, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason', British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2011) 19:543-548.
'Leave Truth Alone: on Deflationism and Contextualism', in European Journal of Philosophy (2011) 19: 416-434.
'Should I Believe the Truth?', dialectica (2010) 64: 213-224.
'Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2009) 90: 535-555.
'Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules and Context', in The Later Wittgenstein on Language, ed. D. Whiting (Palgrave, 2009).
'Between Old and New: Brandom's Analytic Pragmatism', International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2009) 17: 597-607.

For more details of my publications, please see my website. Should you be at a loose end, you can dowload there several of my papers. Of course, if you've any thoughts on any of the issues they discuss - or related topics - I'd be pleased to hear from you.

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